They haven’t dropped the requirement, but you have to manually go in and disable that check yourself on the windows 11 installer if you want to install it on a non-tpm 2.0 machine
Basically, it’s a faff that only the techie people will realistically do. Everyone else will just go out and buy new hardware.
This doesn’t affect valve at all though. It’s borrowing their tech that they’ve made open source, and figuring out how to use it elsewhere outside of steam.
Actually, it’ll benefit them. More eyes are on proton and any fix will benefit everyone, including games played via steam.
Ah yes. I missed that bit. Thanks :)
So if an iPhone gets stolen, would having Find My completely disabled actually be a bad thing if we’re trying to improve device security? I see that’s listed in the article.
Would this affect the ability to use the remote lock & wipe functionality?
Supposedly so long as it’s the Epic Online (EOL) version of EAC, then it’s about as easy as checking a tick box in the settings.
Any developer who cares enough to enable it would most likely test that it works as expected and make a couple of tweaks before announcing the support. It’s usually not a good idea to take a vendor by their word that it “just works”.
What happened afterwards? Did you go off on a self searching quest and come to learn the real you?
WatchOS 10.2 is also needed for enabling Contact Key Verification in iOS 17.2.
You need to enable CKV yourself it seems.
Settings -> Apple ID -> scroll right down to the bottom -> contact key verification.
From memory Apple rejected game pass on iOS because they wanted Microsoft to submit every game (even though they’re all streamed) as separate apps on the App Store to comply with the age rating systems.
I feel like Alan Wake 2 is a different scenario here. Remedy owns the Alan Wake IP and therefore can do what they please with it.
Konami own the Silent Hill IP but have contracted Bloober Team to develop this game. I’d imagine this tweet is them saying Konami needs to give permission before anything can be shared about it.
I think the phrasing is important here.
Later next year, we will be adding support for RCS Universal Profile, the standard as currently published by the GSM Association.
If Google’s & Samsungs implementations aren’t compliant with the GSM associations’ standard then I don’t think this is going to work how people are expecting it to. The stuff Google has added to RCS messaging has all been their own implementation of it and not part of the standard, and as far as I’m aware android RCS gets routed through Google’s servers.
I wonder if RCS support is Apple trying to appease the EU with the DMA stuff forcing messaging apps to be interoperable with each other.
I’ll trust what the cyber security and privacy experts say.
Facebook might know who you’re messaging but that’s also true for Signal.
Signal’s sealed sender does a good job at knowing you’re sending a message, but not who to. All it’ll know on the receiving end is that a message was sent to it.
Of course people have found other methods of identifying this but sealed sender does cover most of the low hanging fruit.
Signal does also purposefully attempt to find ways to not collect any metadata, whilst also making it more difficult for anyone attacking to the servers to find anything. (e.g. ORAM for Secure Enclave operations)
My understanding is that meta used E2EE on your messages themselves, but everything else is up for grabs.
As others have mentioned, the main caveat here is that anti cheat games can work if the developers enable the support.
I’ve been playing dead by daylight very happily for a good few months now on Linux. Apex legends has also got official support for Linux as well.
They watch the horny pokemon things, probably. Rule 34 and all that.
Pulseaudio has been replaced by PipeWire for quite some time in fedora. Since Fedora 34, released in April 2021, apparently.
According to the wiki page, PipeWire originally came about trying to improve video handling on Linux, the same way that pulseaudio improved audio handling.
They then wanted to try and handle audio streams, with the idea of converging use cases for both consumer and professional audio users. Namely, they wanted a single audio system that supported both pulseaudio and JACK, whilst remaining as low latency as possible.
On top of this, because it was a modern reimplementation of audio and video handling in Linux, they designed it to work with Flatpak, and to provide secure methods for screenshotting and screencasting in wayland via the compositors.
(All my info here I just took from the wiki)
It’ll be used by a lot of Linux distributions.
It’s a drop-in replacement to the Pulseaudio and JACK audio systems, with the hopes of making audio handling decent within Linux with as low latency as they can.
It wouldn’t surprise me if WhatsApp’s model on this is what the UK government were thinking of with the Online Safety Bill when they tried to enforce a back door in encrypted messengers.
It’s incredible just how much more interesting metadata can be than the actual message contents.
Explaining this to people when they ask why I don’t use WhatsApp is pretty difficult though.
I wouldn’t feel comfortable if I found out that what I thought was just a casual walk down the street mindlessly chatting with a friend turned out to also involve a third party neither of us were aware of tracking all of our movements.
I’ve not seen this before. This is really neat! Thanks for sharing ❤️
I believe this is down to what they define as being end to end encrypted.
It’s no secret that WhatsApp adopted Signal’s encryption protocol just before Meta acquired them, but since it’s all closed source we don’t know if they’ve changed anything since the announcement in 2016 that all forms of communications on WhatsApp are now encrypted and rolled out.
Within WhatsApp’s privacy policy, it’s important to note that they only mention end to end encryption when it comes to your messages. Everything else is apparently “fair game” for collection. Of note, the Usage and Log information point details all the metadata they collect on you automatically, including how you use the service; how long you use the service; your profile info; the groups you’re in; whether you’re online; and the last time you were online, to name a few things.
I guess what I’m trying to say is that technically they are end to end encrypted by definition, and whilst they’ve gone ahead and implemented things such as encrypted backups (that you must enable) to make it harder for them to read your message contents, they can still collect a lot of metadata on every user.
Got proof for that last claim?
I thought their sealed sender feature was meant to prevent exactly this scenario.